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This paper assesses the eﬀects of international ﬁnancial liberalization and bank-
ing crises on investments and productivity in a sample of 93 countries (at its largest)
observed between 1975 and 1999. I provide empirical evidence that ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion spurs productivity growth and marginally aﬀects capital accumulation. Banking
crises depress both investments and TFP. Both levels and growth rates of productivity
respond to ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises. The paper also presents evi-
dence of conditional convergence in productivity across countries. However, the speed
of convergence is unaﬀected by ﬁnancial liberalization. These results are robust to a
number of econometric speciﬁcations.
JEL Classiﬁcation:G 15, F43, O40, C23
Keywords: Capital account liberalization, equity market liberalization, ﬁnancial
development, banking crises, growth, productivity, investments, convergence.
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11 Introduction
Academic economists and practitioners have long debated over the eﬀects of ﬁnancial glob-
alization on growth. The removal of restrictions on international capital transactions has
on some occasions been welcome as a growth opportunity and in others blamed for trigger-
ing ﬁnancial instability and banking crises. Yet, this debate has not addressed the impact
of ﬁnancial liberalization on the sources of growth.1 Does it aﬀect investments in physical
capital or total factor productivity (TFP), or both? If so, in which ways? This paper
is a ﬁrst attempt at answering these questions. Moreover, it helps understand whether
ﬁnancial globalization has growth or level eﬀects and whether it brings convergence or
divergence in growth rates across countries.
A wide literature has investigated the eﬀects of international ﬁnancial liberalization
on GDP growth. The theoretical predictions are ambiguous. Some works suggest that, by
promoting cross-country risk-diversiﬁcation, ﬁnancial liberalization fosters specialization,
eﬃciency in capital allocation and growth (see, for instance, Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997
and Obstfeld, 1994). By generating international competition, it may also improve the
functioning of domestic ﬁnancial systems, with beneﬁcial eﬀects on savings and allocation
(see Klein and Olivei, 1999 and Levine, 2001). On the other hand, ﬁnancial liberalization
may be harmful for growth in the presence of distortions. It may trigger ﬁnancial insta-
bility, as well as misallocation of capital (see Eichengreen, 2001,f o ras u r v e y ) ,w h i c ha r e
detrimental for macroeconomic performance. The empirical literature has not been able
to resolve this theoretical controversy. Some studies (see, for instance, Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti, 1995, Kraay, 2000 and Rodrick, 1998) found that ﬁnancial liberalization does not
aﬀect growth, others that the eﬀect is positive (Levine, 2001, Bekaert et al., 2003 and
Bonﬁglioli and Mendicino, 2004), yet others that it is negative (Eichengreen and Leblang,
2003). Many authors show the eﬀects to be heterogeneous across countries at diﬀerent
stages of institutional and economic development (see Bekaert et al, 2003, Chinn and Ito,
2003 and Edwards, 2001) and countries with diﬀerent macroeconomic frameworks (Arteta
Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2001). Perhaps surprisingly, very little evidence exists on the
eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization on the various sources of growth.
In this paper, I separately address the eﬀects of international ﬁnancial liberalization
on capital accumulation and TFP levels and growth rates. Financial liberalization, i.e.
the removal of restrictions on international ﬁnancial transactions, may aﬀect productivity
both directly and indirectly. As a direct eﬀect, it is expected to generate international
competition for funds, thereby driving capital towards the most productive projects. In-
1The only evidence in this direction is provided by Levine and Zervos (1998), who estimate the relation
between the sources of growth and measures of stock market integration based on asset pricing models.
2directly, it may foster ﬁn a n c i a ld e v e l o p m e n tw h i c hi nt u r np o s i t i v e l ya ﬀects productivity
(see Beck et al., 2000).2 T h es i g no ft h ed i r e c te ﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on capital
accumulation, through increased international competition, is ambiguous. For instance,
Acemoglu et al. (2005) suggest that the eﬀect of competition may vary depending on
the distance of a country to the world technology frontier. Moreover, the overall eﬀect of
ﬁnancial openness on the stock of capital may be ambiuguous, as capital reallocations may
translate into net inﬂo w sf o rs o m ec o u n t r i e sa n do u t ﬂows for others.3 Given the results in
Beck et al. (2000), I expect the indirect eﬀect through ﬁnancial development to be weak.
As another indirect channel, however, ﬁnancial liberalization may trigger ﬁnancial
instability and banking crises, as a wide literature points out (see Aizenmann, 2001 for a
survey on the evidence on ﬁnancial liberalization and crises). Whatever the mechanism
generating banking crises, such events may harm the ability of a ﬁnancial system to
provide the economy with credit. As a consequence, both investments in physical capital
a n di n n o v a t i o nc a nb ee x p e c t e dt os l o wd o w n . I nt h ew o r s ts c e n a r i o ,e v e nT F Pm i g h t
drop, due to the need for shutting down productive projects. I account for the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial instability by controlling all regressions for banking crises. In this way, any
indirect eﬀect of liberalization through crises is removed from the estimates for the index
of ﬁnancial liberalization. I also estimate the joint eﬀect of crises and liberalization to
assess whether open capital account eases or worsens the recovery from bank crashes.
Before going through these estimations, I explicitely address endogeneity between ﬁnancial
liberalization and banking crises by means of multinomial logit regressions.
I follow three methodologies to assess the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking
crises on investments and productivity, and a fourth to address the link between liber-
alization and crises. I perform diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimation of the the impact of
regime switches, between capital restrictions and openness, and between crises and nor-
mal times. I focus on investment and TFP levels, and I use a panel data with yearly
observations from at most 93 countries over the period 1975-1999. Next, I estimate the
same relationships using ﬁve-year averages. When studying the eﬀects on TFP growth, I
also investigate whether there is evidence of conditional convergence. I estimate an equa-
tion for TFP growth rates as a function of initial productivity and the other controls over
a period of 25 year in a sample of 85 countries. To overcome problems of unobserved
country-speciﬁce ﬀects and endogeneity of regressors, I adopt the system GMM dynamic
2Financial development can be deﬁned as the ability of a ﬁnancial system to reduce information asym-
metries between investors and borrowers, trade and diversify risk, mobilize and pool savings, and ease
transactions. Removing restrictions on international ﬁnancial transactions (ﬁnancial liberalization) may
aﬀect the way a ﬁnancial system carries over its functions, hence ﬁnancial development.
3Alfaro et al. (2004) show that ﬁnancial libralization does not signiﬁcanly aﬀect net capital ﬂows, but
did not examine the interaction between ﬁnancial liberalization and productivity.
3panel technique proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
To assess whether ﬁnancial liberalization favors the occurrence of banking crises, I esti-
mate logits and multinomial logits for an indicator distinguishing between systemic and
borderline crises (see Caprio and Klingebiel, 2002). I use the annual 93-country-panel
spanning between 1975 and 1999.
T h em a i nr e s u l t sa r et h ef o l l o w i n g . ( 1)T h ee ﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on TFP
is positive and large in magnitude, while it is weak and non-robust on investments. (2)
The impact on TFP is both on levels and and growth rates, implying that ﬁnancial liber-
alization is able to spur GDP growth in the short as well as in the long run. (3) Financial
liberalization raises only the probability of minor banking crises in developed countries.
(4) Banking crises harm both capital accumulation and productivity. (5) Institutional and
economic development amplify the positive eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on produc-
tivity and limit the damages from banking crises. (6) Neither ﬁnancial liberalization nor
banking crises aﬀect the speed of convergence in TFP growth rates.
The contribution of this paper is mainly related to three strands of literature. The
literature on growth and development accounting has shown that a large share of cross-
country diﬀerences in economic performance is driven by total factor productivity (TFP)
rather than factor accumulation (physical and human capital).4 Hall and Jones (1999)
point out that a substantial share of GDP per worker variation is explained by diﬀerences in
TFP and provide evidence that productivity is to a large extent determined by institutional
factors. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) show that also GDP growth diﬀerentials are
mainly accounted for by diﬀerences in the growth rates of TFP. These results suggest that
ﬁnancial globalization may aﬀects the wealth of nations through its impact on TFP, rather
than factor accumulation, and that it may be important to distinsuish between the two
channels.
Several authors suggest that ﬁnancial development spurs GDP growth by fostering
productivity growth, not only by raising the funds available for accumulation. Theoretical
papers by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2005), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Aghion,
Howitt and Mayer (2005b) among others show that ﬁnancial development may relieve
risky innovators from credit constraints, thereby fostering growth through technological
change. While earlier contributions (e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) suggest that
ﬁnancial development fosters growth simply by increasing participation in production and
risk pooling, in the later works the relationship is also driven by advances in productivity.
King and Levine (1993), and, in more detail, Beck Levine and Loayza (2000) show evidence
4See Caselli (2005) for a survey on the develpment accounting literature, and Easterly and Levine (2001)
for the stylized facts on development and growth accounting.
4of a strong eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on TFP growth, and only a tenuous eﬀect on
physical capital accumulation.
My analysis of the joint eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises on the
sources of growth is also related to the literature on ﬁnancial fragility and confronts with
some of its predictions. For instance, Martin and Rey (2003) propose a model with multiple
equilibria where ﬁnancial liberalization raises asset prices, investments and income in
emerging market, though leaving the poorest more prone to ﬁnancial crises. In Ranciere
et al. (2004) and Tornell et al. (2004) banking crises may arise as a by-product of
the higher growth generated by ﬁnancial liberalization, in countries with credit market
imperfections. Feijen and Perotti (2005) suggest that ﬁnancial liberalization increases
the likelyhood that the lobbying over the credit market accessibility generates ﬁnancial
fragility in equilibrium. Reinhart and Kaminsky (1999) provide evidence from a sample of
25 countries that ﬁnancial liberalization has predictive power on banking crises. Kaminsky
and Schmuckler (2002) show that this negative eﬀect dominates in the three-four years
immediately after liberalization, then positive growth eﬀects tend to emerge.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
on growth and development accounting, which leads on to the discussion of my empirical
strategy. In section 3, I describe the dataset, with particular attention to the indicators
of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises, as well as the construction of the data for
physical capital and TFP. Section 4 presents the econometric methodologies, and section
5 reports the results from the estimation of the equations for investments. Section 6 shows
the evidence on level and growth rates of TFP and section 7 concludes.
2 The empirical strategy
The literature on growth and developing accounting takes as starting poing the Cobb
Douglas speciﬁcation for the aggregate production function,
Y = AKα (HL)
1−α , (1)
where K is the aggregate capital stock, L the number of workers and H their average
human capital. The term A represents the eﬃciency in the use of factors, and corresponds
to the notion of total factor productivity (TFP). Several contributions on development
accounting (see Caselli, 2005 for a survey and Hall and Jones, 1999) have shown that a
large share of the cross-country variation in GDP per worker, Y
L, is explained by diﬀerences
in A. The works on growth accounting (see Easterly and Levine, 2001 and Klenow and


















have shown that also cross-country diﬀerentials in GDP growth are to a large extent
generated by diﬀerentials in productivity growth (
˙ A
A).
All studies on the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises on growth
have focused on
˙ Y
Y , without assessing whether the eﬀects are transmitted through factor
accumulation or changes in productivity, or both. To grasp the relevance of the exercise
proposed in this paper, consider the following growth regression:
dyit = b0 + b1yit−1 + b0
2Zit + b3FLIBit + b4BCit + uit, (3)
where dyit ≡ dlog(Yit) i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fG D Pi nc o u n t r yi, yit−1 is the logaritm
of lagged GDP, Zit is a vector of control variables, FLIB it and BCit are indicators of
ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises respectively, and uit is the error term. Suppose
t h ee s t i m a t ef o rˆ b3 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This may reﬂect the absence of
an eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on any source of growth, as well as the presence of two
countervailing eﬀects on capital and TFP accumulation. Understanding what lies behind
the eﬀects on aggregate GDP growth may be crucial for policy purposes.
Various aspects of ﬁnancial markets, such as volume, international liberalization and
the occurrence of banking crises, may be expected to aﬀect both physical capital accu-
mulation and factor productivity. Beck et al. (2000) have shown evidence of a strong
eﬀect of ﬁnancial depth on productivity, and a much weaker on capital accumulation.5
Klein and Olivei (1999) and Levine (2001) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial liberalization fosters ﬁnan-
cial development. Should ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises aﬀect investment and
productivity only through the eﬀect on the volume of credits, their impact on TFP and
capital accumulation would thus be expected to be strong and weak respectively. However,
there may be other, more direct eﬀects as well.
Opening up the economy to capital inﬂows and outﬂows increases the degree of com-
petition among international ﬁnancial markets, which may lead to improvements in the
allocative eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial system. This implies that, holding ﬁnancial depth
constant, the average productivity of the ﬁnanced projects might be higher than under
autarky. Financial liberalization also allows for international risk-diversiﬁcation, which
5Financial depth is often used in the empirical literature as a measure of ﬁnancial development, since
it accounts for the weight of ﬁnancial intermediation in the economy.
6may channel more resourses to risky innovation. Both eﬀects may in turn shift resources
away from physical capital accumulation towards TFP growth. As pointed out by Ob-
stfeld (1994), ﬁnancial globalization promotes specialization, just like trade, raising TFP
where productivity is already high, and physical investments in countries far from the
technology frontier.
Banking crises may hit industrial sectors to diﬀerent extents. Financial instability may
induce the investors to take less risk, thereby shifting resources from innovation, which
is typically riskier, to capital accumulation. However, the opposite might happen if a
country deliberately invested in innovation to more quickly recover from the crisis.
3T h e d a t a
I perform the analysis on three datasets: a cross-section of 85 countries with data averaged
over the period 1975 and 1999, and two unbalanced panels comprising up to 93 countries
with annual and ﬁve-year observations over the period 1975-1999. As Table A shows,
the largest sample includes twenty-two developed and seventy-one developing countries
from all continents. The following subsections describe the main variables I include in the
regressions.
3.1 Control variables
When assessing the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises on capital accu-
mulation and productivity, I also control for a number of variables.
• Initial real per capita GDP (rgdpch from the PWT 6.1) accounts for diﬀerent stages
of economic development. It is often claimed that richer countries are more likely to
have open ﬁnancial markets, hence the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization might seem
spurious if initial GDP is not controlled for. If adding this variable to the regressions
does not take away signiﬁcance from the coeﬃcient for ﬁnancial liberalization, the
suspects of spuriousness are less sound.
• I include government expenditure as a ratio of GDP (kg from the PWT 6.1)i n
the regressions for capital accumulation. Several theories predict that government
expenditure crowds out private investments. If this is the case, I should expect a
negative coeﬃcient in the equation for capital accumulation.
• Financial depth, as proxied by the ratio of total credit to the private sector over GDP
(privo from Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2001) and its growth rate give a measure of
the external ﬁnance available to ﬁrms. Klein and Olivei (1999) and Levine (2001)
7show that ﬁnancial liberalization promotes ﬁnancial development, which may be
expected to foster productivity more than capital accumulation, according to Beck
et al. (2000). Bonﬁglioli and Mendicino (2004) also ﬁnd that banking crises have a
negative eﬀect on privo, mainly where institutions are weak. Controlling for ﬁnancial
depth in the equations for both investments and productivity helps disentangle the
direct eﬀects of liberalization and crises from the indirect ones through ﬁnancial
development.
A recent literature on ﬁnancial fragility points out that crises may come along as by-
products of sustained growth of the ﬁnancial system (see Ranciere et al., 2004 and
Tornell et al., 2004). Feijen and Perotti (2005) suggest that equilibria with ﬁnancial
fragility and high participation in the ﬁnancial market may arise where political
accountability is not very high and wealth inequality is high. Including privo and
its growth rate in the logit regressions for banking crises allows me to test a reduced
form of these theoretical predictions.
• I also control for openness to trade, proxied by import plus export as a ratio of
GDP (openk from the PWT 6.1). Trade may aﬀect the eﬃciency of an economy
through several channels, such as specialization according to comparative advantage,
access to larger markets with more product variety and increased competition. These
eﬀects may in turn stimulate both capital accumulation and productivity growth.
However, the impact of trade may also depend on the distance of a country to the
world technology frontier, as suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Aghion,
Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2005).
• Intellectual property right protection is expected to enhance productivity by giving
incentives for innovation. This is controlled for by using the measure (ipr)b yG i n a r t e
and Park (1997), which is available for ﬁve-year periods from 1960 to 1990.
• Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) show that the existence of explicit deposit
insurance increases the likelihood of bank runs and thus crises of the banking sector.
Hence, I include a measure of deposit insurance (depins) from Demirguc-Kunt and
Sobaci (2000) in the logit analysis for banking crises.
• I also control for inﬂation (from the World Development Indicators) in the logit for
banking crises. I take this variable as an indicator of bad macroeconomic policies,
which are likely to make a country prone to crises.
• Finally, I use indicators of economic and institutional development to check for
heterogeneity in the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises on both
8investments and productivity. In the cross-sectional estimates for TFP growth I ex-
plicitely control for institutional quality using the Government Anti-Diversion Policy
index (gadp, from Hall and Jones, 1999) as a proxy. As an indicator of economic
development, I construct a dummy (developing)t h a tt a k e sv a l u e1 if the country
is deﬁned as low or middle-low income in the World Development Indicators, and 0
otherwise. In the panel regressions, I use these indicators to split the sample and
construct interactive terms.
3.2 Financial liberalization
Iu s et w o0 - 1 indicators of ﬁnancial liberalization, which rely on de iure criteria. The ﬁrst
one, CAL, is a dummy variable that takes value 0 if a country has held restrictions on
capital account transactions during the year, and 1 otherwise. The existence of restrictions
is classiﬁed on a 0-1 base by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), which is available for a maximum of 212c o u n t r i e s
over the period 1967- 1996.6 This is the most commonly used indicator of international
ﬁnancial liberalization.
The second indicator relies on the chronology of oﬃcial equity market liberalization,
which is available in Bekaert et al. (2003) for 95 countries from 1980 onwards. It takes
value 1 if international equity trading is allowed in a given country-year, and 0 otherwise.
This dummy variable, EML,d i ﬀers from CAL because it only accounts for equity market
liberalization and not, for instance, credit market liberalization. As opposed to CAL,i t
does not allow for policy reversals: it labels a country as open ever since its ﬁrst year of
liberalization.
Factors aﬀecting capital accumulation and productivity may also inﬂuence the decision
of a country to liberalize ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, there may be countries adopting
such reforms either after reaching certain levels of investments and productivity, or with
the purpose to attain them. This may raise concerns of omitted variables bias or even
endogeneity, when estimating the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on capital accumulation




where FLIB_rit ∈ {CAL_r, EML_r} is an indicator of the reforms observed in country
6Classiﬁcation methods have changed in 1996, so that there are now 13 separate indexes that can hardly
be compared to the previous single indicator. Miniane (2000) harmonized the classiﬁcations, though for a
limited number of countries, and over a short time span.
9i at time t,a n dXit is a set of covariates. CAL_r equals 0 if there are no reforms, 1 if a
switch into capital account liberalization occurs, -1 if the switch is out of it. EML_r does
not admit reversals, thus it equals 1 in case of equity market liberalization reforms, and
0 otherwise. When the dependent variable is CAL_r, the estimation is performed with
a multinomial logit.7 All standard errors are robust and clustered by country. Following
Bekaert et al. (2003), I include among the covariates a measure of institutional qual-
ity (gadp), lagged real GDP (rgdpch), government expenditure (kg), openness to trade
(openk), ﬁnancial depth (privo), inﬂation and GDP growth. I also control for economic
development (developing) and continental dummies.
The results in Table B show the geographical component to capture reforms the most.8
Perhaps surprisingly, the coeﬃcient for gadp, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, tells that
ﬁnancial liberalization is not more frequent in countries with good institutions than in the
others.
3.3 Banking crises
Banking crises are subject to various classiﬁcations. I adopt a zero-one anecdotal indicator
of bank crises, proposed by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), who keep record of 117s y s t e m i c
and 51 non-systemic crises occurring in 93 and 45 countries respectively, from the late
1970’s and onwards. On a yearly base, the variable BC takes value 2 or 1 if the country
has experienced a systemic or borderline banking crisis, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
Caprio and Kilingebiel label a crisis as systemic if a great deal or all of a bank’s capital
has been exhausted and borderline if the losses were less severe. To make this deﬁnition
criterion clearer, I refer to a few episodes. The 1991 crisis in Sweden as well as the 1998-99
crisis in Russia were systemic, since they involved insolvency or serious diﬃculties for 90
and 45 per cent of the banking system, respectively. The isolated failures of three UK
banks between the eighties and the nineties, as well as the solvency problems of Credit
Lyonnais in France in 1994-95, are instead labled as borderline crises.
Before going through the analysis of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on the sources
of growth, I address endogeneity between banking crises and ﬁnancial liberalization, by




7All results are robust to the use of logit and probit on separate indicators: CAL_in (1 for switches
into capital account liberalization, and 0 otherwise) and CAL_out (1 for switches out of capital account
liberalization, and 0 otherwise).
8Note that, if I remove any of the continental dummies, the coeﬃcients for the others remain signiﬁcant.
10The variable BC_typeit takes value one if a banking crisis of a given type (systemic,
borderline, or either one) has occurred in country i at time t.T h e v e c t o r Xit includes
a series of covariates, and FLIBit is the binary indicator of ﬁnancial liberalization. To
appreciate the eﬀects of all covariates, I also estimate a multinomial logit for BCit,w h i c h
takes values 1 and 2 in case of borderline and systemic crises respectively, and zero when
no crises occur.9 I cluster the standard errors by country.
Table C reports the results for BC_all, which equals 1 if any type of crisis has occurred,
and 0 otherwise. Neither indicator of FLIB has signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates. The
variables raising the likelihood of crises the most are high inﬂation and the existence of
explicit deposit insurance, as already shown by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).
High real GDP per capita and growth rate of ﬁnancial depth signiﬁcantly reduce the
probability of crisis. The ﬁrst result is in line with the predictions in Martin and Rey
(2004), while the second seems to contraddict the “bumpy path” hypothesis proposed by
Ranciere et al. (2004) and Tornell et al. (2004). Splitting the sample between developed
and developing countries (columns 3-4 and 7-8), I ﬁnd that CAL has a positive eﬀect on
the likelihood of banking crises in developed countries, while the growth rate of private
credit is a more important factor in developing countries.
Finally, I exploit the classiﬁcation in Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) and estimate with
a multinomial logit the eﬀects of all covariates on systemic versus borderline banking
crises. Table D shows that CAL only has a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of borderline
banking crises in developed countries. The positive coeﬃc i e n ti nc o l u m n3o fT a b l eC
is explained by the fact that most banking crises in developed countries are borderline.
Deposit insurance, high real per capita GDP and the growth rate of ﬁnancial depth mainly
aﬀect the probability of systemic crises. High inﬂation has opposite eﬀects on the likelihood
of the two types of crises: negative for borderline and positive for systemic crises. Equity
market liberalization has no eﬀe c ta ta l l .
3.4 Capital accumulation
I construct the series of the log-diﬀerence of physical capital stocks (dk) following the
perpetual inventory method as in Hall and Jones (1999), using data from the Penn World
Tables 6.1. I estimate the initial stock of capital, Kt0 as
It0
g+δ, where g is the average
geometric growth rate of total investments between t0 and t0+1 0 .10 In the paper t0 is
9I estimated the same model with pooled probit and ﬁxed eﬀects probit. Since the results are not
sensitive to the estimation technique, I just report coeﬃcients from the multinomial logit estimates.
10Investments are deﬁned as I = ki*rgdpch*pop from the PWT 6.1.
111960, since I have data on investments dating back to that year for most countries.11 A
depreciation rate δ of 6 per cent in ten years is assumed. The later values of the capital
stock are easily computed as Kt =( 1 − δ)Kt−1+ It.
3.5 Productivity
I construct the series of total factor productivity following the Hall and Jones (1999)





where Yi is the output produced in country i, Ki is the stock of physical capital in use, Ai is
labor-augenting productivity, Li is the labor in use (rgdpch* pop/ rgdpwok from the PWT
6.1), and Hi is a measure of the average human capital of workers (HiLi is therefore human
capital-augmented labor).12 The factor share α is assumed constant across countries and
equal to 1/3, which matches national account data for developed countries. I adopt the
following speciﬁcation for labor-augmenting human capital as a function of the years of
schooling, si:
Hi = eφ(si).
I rely on the results of Psacharopulos’ (1994) survey and specify φ(si) as a piecewise linear
function with coeﬃcients 0.134 for the ﬁrst four years of education, 0.101 for the next four
years, and 0.068 for any value of si > 8.
Equipped with data on capital, output per worker, population and schooling (from












4 Econometric specifications and methodologies
In the next sections, I follow various methodologies to estimate the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
liberalization and banking crises on the sources of growth. First, I fully exploit the cross-
sectional and time-series information in the annual dataset and estimate
Pit = β0 + β0
1Xit−1 + γFLIBit−1 + δBCit−1 + ηi + νt + εit, (4)
11I nt h ec o u n t r i e sw h i c hh a v en od a t af o r1960 t0 is the ﬁr s ty e a rf o l l o w e db ya tl e a s t15o b s e r v a t i o n s .
12In Hall and Jones (1999) Yi is rgdpch*pop from the PWT, net of the value-added of the mining
industry. Following Caselli (2005), I simplify and take rgdpch*pop.




A or log(A) in the variuos
speciﬁcations) observed in country i at year t, X are control variables, FLIB is a dummy
for ﬁnancial liberalization and BC an indicator of banking crises. To reduce problems with
simultaneity bias, all regressors enter as lagged values. ηi is a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect
capturing heterogeneity in the determinants of P that are speciﬁct oi. Its inclusion in (4)
implies that γ is only estimated from the within-country variation around the liberalization
date. The ﬁxed year eﬀects (νt) allow me to compare the change in P between the pre and
post-reform periods in countries that have liberalized with the change in the countries that
maintained the restrictions. This means that equation (4) is a “diﬀerence in diﬀerence”
speciﬁcation, since it implies diﬀerencing out the time-mean for each i, and the common
trend for all i’s at any t.
Two main problems may undermine the ability of γ to identify a causal link from
ﬁnancial liberalization to the sources of growth. First, there may be concerns about the
selection of the countries that liberalized. As the results in Table B suggest, geographical
location is a good predictor for reforms on international capital transactions. Suppose
there are fewer liberalization episodes among countries of a certain area which also expe-
riences particularly low productivity growth. This area-speciﬁc productivity trend may
bias the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization upwards. To control for this bias, I check if there
are such diﬀerences across areas (Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe+North America)
and, if so, I include interacted time-area dummies. Table E reports the percentage of ob-
servations with capital account and equity market liberalization reforms (rows 1-2 and 4,
respectively), the share of country-years with open capital and equity markets (rows 3 and
5), and the means of TPF (levels and growth) and capital accumulation across continents.
Note from rows 1 and 2 that Africa, accounting for almost half of the sample, has the least
number of capital account reforms and a very bad performance in terms of productivity
growth. On the other hand, Europe and North America have the highest incidence of
unreverted capital account liberalizations, the best performance in terms of productivity
and the worst in capital accumulation. Moreover, in row 4, Asia has the highest number
of equity market reforms and the highest average TFP growth. This suggest to control the
diﬀerence in diﬀerence regressions for continental trends in both productivity and capital
accumulation.
A problem of endogeneity of policy changes may also arise. Suppose a country opens
up when experiencing an economic crisis to help the recovery or alternatively when it is
already on a sustained growth path. This may attribute a negative or positive eﬀect to
ﬁnancial liberalization which is actually due to a trend, thereby producing biased esti-
mates. As a solution to this problem, I control for a dummy taking value 1 during the
13three or ﬁve years prior to the liberalization and zero otherwise. This allows me to verify
whether the change in P was part of a previous trend or caused by liberalization.
To assess the eﬀects of policy changes and banking crises in the medium-run, I also
perform diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates on a ﬁve-year panel dataset. In this case, the
dependent variable is observed at the end of the period, while the regressors are expressed
as beginning-of-period values.
When investingating TFP growth, I am also interested in the eﬀects of liberalization
along the transition. Therefore, I estimate the following productivity growth regression:
dai(t−τ,t) = β0 + λait−τ + β0
1Xi(t−τ,t) + γFLIBi(t−τ,t) + δBCi(t−τ,t) + uit, (5)
where dai(t−τ,t) =1 0 0
log(Ait)−log(Ait−τ)
τ and the regressors indexed by (t − τ, t) are τ-year
period averages. A coeﬃcient estimate ˆ λ<0 indicates that there is conditional conver-
gence in productivity. The speed of convergence b can be obtained from the deﬁnition of
λ = −1001−ebτ
τ .Iﬁrst estimate equation (5) on a 25-year cross section (τ= 25). As enpha-
sized by the empirical growth literature (see Temple, 1999 for a survey), cross-sectional
estimates have several limits. They do not allow me to exploit the time-series variation in
the data, which is important to assess the eﬀects of reforms, such as ﬁnancial iberalization;
nor to control for omitted variables, country-speciﬁce ﬀects and endogeneity of the regres-
sors. In this case, addressing endogeneity with an instrumental variable strategy looks
rather diﬃcult. Legal origins may be a good instrument for ﬁnancial development (see La
Porta et al, 1997), but do not look particularly suitable to instrument a variable as FLIB,
which involves policy changes and perhaps reversals over the sample. Bekaert et al. (2003)
address the issue by separately estimating a probit for FLIB,a n dﬁnd that the quality of
institutions is crucial in determining the choice of liberalization. But as the institutional
framework is known to be an important determinant of TFP (see, among others, Hall and
Jones, 1999), it does not seem a valid instrument for FLIB, in a regression for TFP.
I address the ﬁrst problem by turning to panel data. Note that the speciﬁcation of
equation (5) with uit = ηi+ νt+ εit includes the lagged dependent variable. It follows
that, even if εit is not correlated with ait−τ, the estimates are not consistent with a
ﬁnite time span. Moreover, consistency may be undermined by the endogeneity of other
explanatory variables, as in the cross-sectional estimates. To correct for the bias created by
lagged endogenous variables, and the simultaneity of some regressors, I follow the approach
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). I estimate the
14following system with GMM
dait = β0 + θdait−5 + β0
1dXit + γdFLIBit + δdBCit + dνt + dεit (6)
ait = β0 + θait−5 + β0
1Xi(t−5,t) + γFLIBi(t−5,t) + δBCi(t−5,t) + ηi + νt + εit, (7)
where dait equals log( Ait
Ait−5), and the other regressors are the same as in the previous equa-
tions. Levels indexed by (t − 5,t ) are ﬁve-year averages. ηi, νt and εit are respectively
the unobservable country- and time-speciﬁce ﬀects, and the error term, respectively. The
presence of country eﬀect in equation (7) corrects the omitted variable bias. The diﬀer-
ences in equation (6) and the instrumental variables estimation of the system are aimed at
amending inconsistency problems. I instrument diﬀerences of the endogenous and prede-
t e r m i n e dv a r i a b l e sw i t hl a g g e dl e v e l si ne q u a t i o n( 6 )a n dl e v e l sw i t hd i ﬀerenced variables
in equation (7). For instance, I take ait−15 as an instrument for dait−5 and Flibit−10 for
dFLIBit in (6) and dait−10 as an instrument for ait−5 and dFLIBit−5 for FLIBit in (7).
I estimate the system by two-step Generalized Method of Moments with moment condi-
tions E[dait−5s (εit − εit−5)] = 0 for s ≥ 2,a n dE[dzit−5s (εit − εit−5)] = 0 for s ≥ 2 on
the predetermined variables z, for equation (6); E[dai,t−5s (ηi + εi,t)] = 0 and E[dzi,t−5s
(ηi + εi,t) ]=0for s =1for equation (7). I treat all regressors as predetermined. The
validity of the instruments is guaranteed under the hypothesis that εit are not second order
serially correlated. Coeﬃcient estimates are consistent and eﬃc i e n ti fb o t ht h em o m e n t
conditions and the no-serial correlation are satisﬁed. To validate the estimated model, I
apply a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, and a test of second-order serial corre-
lation of the residuals. As pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991), the estimates from
the ﬁrst step are more eﬃcient, while the test statistics from the second step are more
robust. Therefore, I will report coeﬃcients and statistics from the ﬁrst and second step
respectively. Note that in this case the speed of convergence (divergence) is given by θ =
e5b.
5 Financial liberalization, banking crises and capital accumulation
In this section, I estimate the following equation for investments
dkit = β0 + β0
1Xit−τ + γFLIBit−τ + δBCit−τ + ηi + νt + εit,
15where dkit =1 0 0
log(Kit)−log(Kit−τ)
τ proxies physical capital accumulation observed in coun-
try i at time t.13 It a k ed i ﬀerent frequencies, with τ equal to one and ﬁve years respectively,
to assess the impact on the short and medium run. When I use the ﬁve-year panel, the
dependent variable is observed at the end of the period and the regressors at the begin-
ning. Since FLIB is a binary indicator variable both in the annual and ﬁve-year panel,
the coeﬃcients will be diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates.
Table 1a reports the results from the diﬀerence in diﬀerence regessions of dk on yearly
data. The speciﬁcation in coulumn 1 only includes the indicators of capital account
liberalization (CAL) and banking crises (BC), whose eﬀects on investments are nil and
negative, respectively. These coeﬃcients are robust to controlling for trends in investments
up to three years prior to capital account liberalization (CAL_switch3) and for time-
continent eﬀects, as reported in column 2.14 Column 3 shows that banking crises have no
diﬀerent eﬀect across ﬁnancially open and restricted countries. When I control for real per
capita GDP, government expenditure as a ratio of GDP and credit to the private sector as
a ratio of GDP (column 4), CAL remains insigniﬁcant, while the negative coeﬃcient for
BC becomes only marginally signiﬁcant (it is diﬀerent from zero at the ten per cent level).
Note however that its signiﬁcance is fully restored when any of the additional controls is
removed from the regression (result not reported). The coeﬃcients in column 4 show that
richer countries accumulate more capital, while government expenditure tends to crowd out
investments. The growth rate of physical capital is lower where ﬁnancial intermediation
(as proxied by privo) is higher and has grown less (the latter is not reported, but available
upon request). This suggests that countries invest more in physical capital when their
ﬁnancial systems are at early stages of development and growing rapidly. Columns 5 and
6 report the estimates for the subsamples of developed and developing countries, as deﬁned
by the World Bank.15 Interestingly, capital account liberalization has a positive eﬀect on
investments in the developed countries, and no impact in the others. As in column 4,
removing any of the additional controls restores the negative coeﬃcient for BC, without
aﬀecting the positive estimate for CAL in the developed countries. Finally, the results
are robust to the inclusion of openness to trade, whose coeﬃcient always turns out to be
insigniﬁcant and is thus omitted.
In Table 1b I replicate the estimations of Table 1a replacing the capital account indi-
cator with the indicator of equity market liberalization. All columns suggest that EML
13The evidence is robust to the use of investments as a ratio of GDP as a proxy of the dependent variable.
The results are availablie upon request.
14The results do not change if I use CAL_switch5, which equals 1 for the ﬁve years prior to the reform.
15Heterogeneity in the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization could also be addressed by including an interacted
dummy FLIB∗ developing in the full-sample regression. This method, however, may deliver biased
estimates if there is heterogeneity in other coeﬃcients, as shown in Tables 1a-1b.
16has a positive eﬀect on capital accumulation, while the other regressors behave as in Table
1a.16
The diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates from the ﬁve-year panel, reported in Tables
2a-2b, do not show any signiﬁcant diﬀerences from the results obtained on the annual
dataset. Capital account liberalization has almost no eﬀect on investments, while equity
market liberalization is generally investment-enhancing. Holding the other factors and
TFP constant, these results would support the evidence in Bekaert et al (2003) that
open equity markets promote GDP growth, while open capital account, as such, is not as
eﬀective.
6 Financial liberalization, banking crises and productivity
In this section I estimate the eﬀects of FLIB both on the level of TFP and its growth
rate, which both contribute GDP growth. As pointed out by Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997), any increase in productivity does not only raise output holding constant
factor employment, but also fosters factor accumulation, which translates into higher
GDP growth along the transition.
6.1 Level TFP: difference in difference estimates
I estimate the following equation for the logaritm of the level of TFP (a),
ait = β0 + β0
1Xit−τ + γFLIBit−τ + δBCit−τ + ηi + νt + εit,
in the panel datasets with annual and ﬁve-year data. When I use the ﬁve-year panel, the
dependent variable is observed at the end of the period and the regressors at the beginning.
As already mentioned in sections 4 and 5, this is a diﬀerence in diﬀerence speciﬁcation.
Tables 3a and 3b report results from the yearly panel. The coeﬃcients for CAL and
EML are positive and signiﬁcant across all speciﬁcations in columns 1-4. While equity
market liberalization has a stronger eﬀect in developing countries, the removal of capital
account restrictions is beneﬁcial in all countries, as shown by columns 5-6 of both tables.
Banking crises have a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on TFP under all speciﬁcations.
Note that when I add intellectual property rights protection among the regressors, twenty
countries drop out of the sample due to missing observations. Nevertheless, the estimates
for CAL, EML and BC in the equations of columns 1-3 do not change if I restrict
16T h ee s t i m a t i o ns a m p l eo fT a b l e1b is a subset of the sample in Table1a. However, the coeﬃcients for
CAL are not sensitive to the sample. Results from re-estimating Table 1ao nt h es a m p l eo fT a b l e1ba r e
available upon request.
17the sample. Interestingly, the coeﬃcients for privo in columns 4-6 suggest that ﬁnancial
development on average tends to have a positive eﬀect on productivity. However, its eﬀect
is positive in the developing countries and negative in the developed ones. This result
may support the hypothesis that ﬁnancial development favors convergence in productivity.
Notice that the coeﬃcients for ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises remain signiﬁcant,
even after controlling for ﬁnancial development. This suggest that both have a direct eﬀect
on productivity. The coeﬃcient estimates for ipr conﬁrm the expectations of a positive
eﬀect on TFP, mainly in the developed countries where R&D capacity is probably higher.
In Tables 4a and 4b I report the results from the diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates on
the ﬁve-year panel. Here, the dependent variable is observed at the end of the ﬁve-year
period, the dummy for ﬁnancial liberalizaiton takes value 1 if a country has experienced
no restrictions for at least one year and BC equals one if there has been at least one year
of banking crisis. The positive coeﬃcients for CAL is signiﬁcant in the basic speciﬁcation
of column 1 and remains signiﬁcant when I include pre-reform trends, continent-time
eﬀects and the full set of control variables. BC has a negative eﬀect on TFP under
every speciﬁcation. The positive coeﬃcient for equity market liberalization is more robust
than that for CAL, and survives in most columns of Table 4b. Among the other control
variables, the most signiﬁcant is ﬁnancial depth, which aﬀects productivity positively in
the developing countries, as in Tables 3a and 3b.
6.2 TFP growth and convergence
To evaluate the eﬀects on productivity growth, I perform cross-sectional estimations of
the following equation:
dai(t−25,t) = β0 + λait−25 + β0
1Xi(t−25,t) + γFLIBi(t−25,t) + δBCi(t−25,t) + εit.
The regressors indexed by (t−25,t ) are expressed in twenty-ﬁve-year averages. It follows
that the estimates for γ and δ capture the eﬀects of the occurrence and length of ﬁnancial
liberalization and banking crises on productivity growth. Period averages cannot, though,
discriminate between liberalizations and crises happening early and late in the sample,
nor between inerrupted and uninterrupted episodes amounting to the same mean.
The results in Tables 5a and 5b support the hypothesis of conditional convergence in
productivity in robust way, with an implied speed of convergence b between1 a n d2pe rc e n t
per year.17 The eﬀect of banking crises on TFP growth is negative and signiﬁcant under
all speciﬁcations. In Table 5a, capital account liberalization has a positive and signiﬁcant
17Remember that the speed of convergence is computed from λ = −100 1−e25b
25 .
18coeﬃcient only under the basic speciﬁcation (column1), and has no diﬀerent eﬀect across
countries that experienced banking crises or and those that did not (column 2). The
coeﬃcient for at−25 ∗ CAL, aimed at assessing whether ﬁnancial liberalization aﬀects the
pace of convergence, is nil in column 3. EML in Table 5b holds a positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient throughout columns 1-3. Like CAL, it does not interact with banking crises
nor with the initial level of productivity. It loses its signiﬁc a n c eo n c eIc o n t r o lf o rG A D P
in columns 4 and 5. Both Table 5a and 5b suggest that the institutional factors captured
by GADP, together with initial productivity, are the most important determinant of TFP
growth. None of the other control variables seem to aﬀect productivity growth.
The dynamic panel data estimates in Tables 6 and 7 conﬁrm the cross sectional evi-
dence in favor of conditional convergence in productivity. The implied speed of convergence
is now higher and lies between 1.2 and 4.4 per cent per year. Both measures of FLIB
spur productivity growth in a robust way, while the negative eﬀe c to fb a n k i n gc r i s e si sn o w
weaker. The coeﬃcients for both CAL and EML lose signiﬁcance only when I control for
privo in columns 3 and 6. This suggests that the growth rate of TFP, as opposed to its
level, is mostly aﬀected by ﬁnancial liberalization through ﬁnancial development rather
than directly. This evidence is consistent with the results obtained for GDP growth in
Bonﬁglioli and Mendicino (2004). Trade does not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on TFP
growth.
Table 7 reports the results for the interactions of ﬁnancial liberalization with banking
crises, and the interaction of both FLIBand BC with the level of economic development.
Columns 1 and 2 show that banking crises and capital account liberalization do not aﬀect
the speed of convergence, while EML slows it down. Equity market liberalization has
a larger beneﬁt on the countries with higher initial productivity levels, which recalls the
predictions in Aghion et al. (2005b) for ﬁnancial development and Aghion et al. (2005a)
for product market liberalization. The coeﬃcients in columns 3 and 4 suggest that the joint
eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises harms productivity growth. Columns
5a n d6s h o wt h a tBC lowers TFP growth everywhere, while FLIB has positive eﬀects
in developed and negative eﬀects in the developing countries. The same holds in columns
7 and 8, where I distinguish between countries with high and low institutional quality,
as measured by GADP. These results support the existence of a robust positive eﬀect of
ﬁnancial liberalization on productivity. Arguably, the threat of an increase in competition
for funds from abroad favors the channeling of resources towards innovative projects raising
aggregate TFP.
197C o n c l u s i o n s
A wide literature has focused on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on GDP growth, often
ﬁnding mixed results. To better understand the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization, however, it
is important to know the channels through which it operates. This paper has attempted to
probe deeper into the relationship by separately studying the impact of ﬁnancial openness
on two sources of income growth: capital accumulation and productivity. Contrary to the
existing literature, I ﬁnd fairly robust results. In particular, ﬁnancial liberalization has
little eﬀect on capital accumulation, while it has a strong positive eﬀect on productivity.
Financial liberalization appears to spur TFP growth through ﬁnancial development, while
it has a direct impact on the productivity level.
The paper has also studied the impact of ﬁnancial instability on economic performance
and the relationship between ﬁnancial openness and crisis. As expected, crises are found
to be detrimental, both for productivity and capital accumulation. However, there is no
evidence that ﬁnancial openness increases the likelihood of crisis, except for borderline
crisis in developing countries. Thus, the concern that the removal of barriers to capital
mobility may expose an economy to higher ﬁnancial risk seems unwarranted.
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27Africa 15.426 *** -15.299 ** -0.759 **
4.508 7.287 0.318
Asia 15.653 *** 19.469 *** -0.713
4.534 7.177 0.452
Latin America 17.326 *** 22.334 *** -0.980 ***
4.585 7.308 0.344
Europe & N. America 15.592 *** -17.587 ** -3.379 ***
4.644 7.884 1.073
developing 0.304 -0.198 0.072
0.394 1.002 0.291
gadp 3.333 0.317 1.226
2.223 3.419 1.219
growth 1.041 -7.302 2.546
5.418 4.758 3.582
inflation -0.013 * -0.004 0.000
0.007 0.003 0.000
kg 0.148 -0.576 -0.265
0.397 0.481 0.310
openk 0.237 0.721 0.149
0.277 0.532 0.239
privo -0.533 ** 0.085 -0.049
0.261 0.507 0.235




Financial liberalization - yearly panel - logit and multinomial logit
Note. CAL_in and CAL_out indicate switches on and off capital account
liberalization, respectively. The coefficients in theese columns are estimated with
multinomial logit. EML_in indicates reforms of equity market liberalization. The
coefficients in this column are estimated with logit. Africa, Asia, Latin America and
Europe & N. America are continental dummies. Developingis a dummy for developing
countries as defined by the World Bank. The variables growth, inflation, gov, open,
privo and rgdp enter as lagged values. A constant is included in all regressions. The
robust standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Asia Africa Latin America
Europe & N. 
America
CAL_in 1.37 0.43 3.22 2.95
CAL_out 0.34 0 2.89 0
CAL 41.16 1.29 28.94 43.51
EML_in 5 3.41 3.81 1.14
EML 50 53 17.41 74.19
Level TFP 1.116 1.547 1.864 2.084
TFP growth -0.114 -2.286 -2.559 -0.207
Capital accumulation 6.884 4.223 3.182 3.167
Observations 294 699 311 239
Table E
Reforms and financial liberalization across continents
Note. The table reports the share (%) of observations with capital account and equity
market liberalization (CAL and EML, respectively), switches into and out of capital
account liberalization (CAL_in and CAL_out), and into equity market liberalization
(EML_in). For the other variables, means are reported.
311234 5 6
Developed Developing
CAL 0.700 0.412 0.273 0.528 1.956 ** 0.099
0.623 0.761 0.802 0.955 0.779 1.340
BC -0.782 *** -0.702 *** -0.754 *** -0.500 * -0.473 -0.496
0.217 0.224 0.243 0.305 0.304 0.403
CAL_BC 0.326
0.599
lkg -2.528 *** -1.673 ** -3.700 ***
0.840 0.744 1.227
lprivo -1.021 * -1.239 ** -1.343 *
0.610 0.566 0.831
lrgdpch 5.036 *** 2.573 5.426 **
1.668 1.691 2.189
CAL_switch3 -0.319 -0.314 0.043 -0.060 -0.113
0.707 0.707 0.891 0.874 1.174
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1900 1900 1900 1385 361 1024
C o u n t r i e s 9 39 39 37 9 2 0 5 9
1234 5 6
Developed Developing
EML 0.995 *** 0.965 *** 1.066 *** 0.629 * 1.446 ** 0.687 *
0.242 0.315 0.336 0.339 0.631 0.420
BC -0.664 *** -0.483 *** -0.436 *** -0.341 *** -0.263 -0.150
0.092 0.100 0.114 0.107 0.220 0.131
EML_BC -0.204
0.237
lkg -1.007 *** -2.517 *** 0.191
0.338 0.520 0.485
lprivo -0.501 ** -0.223 -1.192 ***
0.254 0.432 0.345
lrgdpch 3.511 *** 3.890 ** 3.858 ***
0.777 1.523 0.963
EML_switch3 0.449 0.457 0.422 1.209 ** 0.328
0.284 0.284 0.298 0.548 0.361
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1482 1248 1248 1026 286 740
C o u n t r i e s 7 87 87 86 9 1 8 5 1
Note. The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of physical capital stock (dk). All regressors are in
lagged values. The variables CAL_switch3 and EML_switch3 equal 1 in the 3 years prior to capital account
and equity market reforms, respectively. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a
constant. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10,
5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 1a
Capital account liberalization and capital accumulation - yearly panel - difference in difference




CAL 0.266 0.425 -0.438 0.658 0.703 0.846
0.497 0.559 0.637 0.503 0.447 0.755
BC -0.005 *** -0.899 *** -0.207 *** -0.640 ** -0.381 -0.608 *
0.281 0.289 0.340 0.266 0.266 0.364
CAL_BC 0.383 *
0.608
lkg -0.684 -0.054 ** -0.364
0.496 0.503 0.662
lprivo 0.793 0.608 0.050
0.377 0.758 0.449
lrgdpch -0.589 -2.697 * -0.676
0.850 0.584 0.046
CAL_switch5 -0.540 -0.550 -0.744 * -0.469 -0.033
0.477 0.475 0.425 0.398 0.630
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 457 457 457 353 98 255
C o u n t r i e s 9 39 39 38 5 2 2 6 3
1234 5 6
Developed Developing
EML 0.604 0.786 * 0.583 0.830 -0.168 0.401
0.395 0.470 0.581 0.591 0.877 0.801
BC -0.722 *** -0.589 ** -0.724 ** -0.471 * -0.149 -0.550
0.249 0.249 0.337 0.264 0.283 0.364
EML_BC 0.318
0.535
lkg -1.271 ** -0.910 -1.214
0.548 0.558 0.790
lprivo -0.150 1.360 -0.157
0.449 0.956 0.551
lrgdpch -0.759 -2.199 -0.867
1.118 2.197 1.413
EML_switch5 -1.345 -1.262 -2.392 -1.626 0.281
2.295 2.303 2.661 3.327 3.689
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 312 312 312 268 80 188
C o u n t r i e s 7 87 87 87 3 2 1 5 2
Note. The dependent variable is the 5-year average annual growth rate of physical capital stock (dk). All
control variables are observed at the beginning of the period. CAL and EML equal 1 if liberalization is
observed for at least one year in the period. The variables CAL_switch5 and EML_switch5 equal 1 in the
5-year period prior to capital account and equity market reforms, respectively. The sample spans between
1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are clustereded by country. *, ** and
*** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 2a
Capital account liberalization and capital accumulation - yearly panel - difference in difference
Table 2b
Equity market liberalization and capital accumulation - yearly panel - difference in difference
331234 5 6
Developed Developing
CAL 0.140 *** 0.054 ** 0.048 ** 0.104 *** 0.104 ** 0.123 ***
0.020 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.047 0.030
BC -0.063 *** -0.053 *** -0.055 *** -0.057 *** -0.108 *** -0.049 ***
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.018 0.008
CAL_BC 0.016
0.017
lprivo 0.031 ** -0.069 ** 0.068 ***
0.015 0.032 0.018
lopenk -0.013 0.078 -0.023
0.022 0.102 0.023
ipr 0.016 * 0.042 ** 0.005
0.009 0.019 0.011
CAL_switch3 -0.003 -0.003 0.026 -0.022 0.040 *
0.020 0.020 0.019 0.047 0.022
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1844 1844 1844 1119 309 810
C o u n t r i e s 9 39 39 37 3 1 8 5 5
1234 5 6
Developed Developing
EML 0.112 *** 0.111 *** 0.096 *** 0.071 *** 0.015 0.080 ***
0.016 0.019 0.020 0.023 0.060 0.026
BC -0.047 *** -0.042 *** -0.050 *** -0.050 *** -0.091 *** -0.041 ***
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.019 0.008
EML_BC 0.031 *
0.014
lprivo 0.009 -0.061 * 0.046 **
0.017 0.034 0.023
lopenk -0.008 0.028 -0.015
0.027 0.134 0.028
ipr 0.014 0.063 *** -0.009
0.009 0.019 0.011
EML_switch3 0.024 0.023 0.001 -0.025 0.011
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.043 0.020
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 1451 1224 1224 814 239 575
C o u n t r i e s 7 87 87 86 7 1 8 4 9
Note. The dependent variable is the logaritm of TFP level (a). All regressors are in lagged values. The variables
CAL_switch3 and EML_switch3 equal 1 in the 3 years prior to capital account and equity market reforms,
respectively. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors are
clustered by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent,
respectively.
Table 3a
Capital account liberalization and level TFP - yearly panel - difference in difference
Table 3b
Equity market liberalization and level TFP - yearly panel - difference in difference
341234 5 6
Developed Developing
CAL 0.132 *** 0.070 0.073 0.121 ** 0.032 0.063
0.047 0.048 0.056 0.058 0.064 0.085
BC -0.093 *** -0.075 *** -0.073 ** -0.112 *** -0.032 -0.112 ***
0.027 0.026 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.039
CAL_BC -0.007
0.054
lprivo 0.080 ** -0.069 0.103 **
0.035 0.059 0.041
lopenk 0.002 -0.011 0.046
0.055 0.042 0.082
ipr -0.013 0.193 ** -0.044
0.089 0.085 0.119
CAL_switch5 -0.046 -0.046 -0.036 -0.030 -0.045
0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.061
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 443 443 443 238 71 167
C o u n t r i e s 9 39 39 37 8 2 0 4 8
1234 5 6
Developed Developing
EML 0.086 ** 0.120 *** 0.070 0.175 *** -0.013 0.094
0.040 0.045 0.054 0.066 0.096 0.090
BC -0.091 *** -0.073 *** -0.107 *** -0.099 *** -0.015 -0.123 ***
0.025 0.023 0.032 0.031 0.028 0.043
EML_BC 0.080
0.050
lprivo 0.121 *** 0.067 0.149 ***
0.046 0.083 0.055
lopenk 0.004 0.006 0.039
0.067 0.053 0.100
ipr 0.078 0.494 *** -0.032
0.139 0.158 0.173
EML_switch5 -0.289 -0.270 -0.573 * -0.062 -0.232
0.216 0.215 0.304 0.358 0.416
Time-continent No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 304 304 304 178 56 122
C o u n t r i e s 7 87 87 86 4 2 0 4 4
Note. The dependent variable is the 5-year average logaritmof TFP level (a). All control variables are observed
at the beginning of the period. CAL and EML equal 1 if liberalization is observed for at least one year in the
period. The variables CAL_switch5 and EML_switch5 equal 1 in the 5-year period prior to capital account and
equity market reforms, respectively. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a
constant. Standard errors are clustereded by country. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at
10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
Table 4
Capital account liberalization and level TFP - 5-year panel - difference in difference
Table 4b
Equity market liberalization and level TFP - 5-year panel - difference in difference
3512345
a_25 -1.109 ** -1.102 ** -1.097 ** -1.374 *** -1.563 ***
0.448 0.446 0.480 0.433 0.416
CAL 1.326 * 0.577 1.523 0.236 -0.214
0.713 1.059 1.876 0.590 0.654
BC -4.134 *** -4.464 *** -4.144 *** -3.587 *** -3.961 ***













R2 0.186 0.190 0.186 0.340 0.485
O b s 8 58 58 58 57 3
12345
a_25 -0.871 * -0.868 * -0.928 * -1.299 *** -1.215 ***
0.463 0.474 0.520 0.411 0.439
EML 2.380 *** 2.797 *** 1.869 0.117 -0.040
0.641 1.016 1.464 0.710 0.665
BC -2.501 * -2.063 -2.435 * -2.448 ** -2.801 **













R2 0.236 0.238 0.237 0.409 0.432
O b s 7 27 27 27 26 5
Note. The dependent variable is the 25-year average annual growth rate of TFP
(da). All regressors are expressed as period average, except for the logaritm of
the initial TFP level. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All
regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are reported below the
coefficients. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5 and
1 per cent, respectively.
Table 5a
Capital account liberalization and TFP Growth - cross-section
Table 5b
Equity market liberalization and TFP Growth - cross-section
36123456
da_1 0.834 *** 0.899 *** 0.893 *** 0.911 *** 0.890 *** 0.936 ***
0.089 0.069 0.050 0.083 0.072 0.038
dCAL 0.133 *** 0.136 *** 0.073
0.050 0.052 0.053
dEML 0.027 0.021 -0.038
0.054 0.057 0.072
dBC -0.064 -0.048 -0.079 ** -0.035 -0.075 ** -0.082 **
0.040 0.035 0.036 0.045 0.036 0.039
dlopenk -0.038 0.031 0.051 -0.048
0.084 0.085 0.112 0.056
dlprivo 0.068 ** 0.046
0.028 0.032
Sargan (pvalue) 0.670 0.727 0.472 0.352 0.642 0.559
m2 (pvalue) 0.843 0.757 0.487 0.490 0.822 0.885
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 433 371 329 301 263 253
Countries 89 78 75 76 67 67
Table 6
TFP Growth - Dynamic Pane Data - System GMM
Note. The dependent variable is the 5-year log-difference of TFP level (da). All regressors are 5-
year period averages. The sample spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant.
The estimation is performed with the two-step system-GMM procedure. Coefficients and standard
errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at 10, 5
and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order
serial correlation (m2) test are reported from the second step.
3712 34 5678
da_1 0.917 *** 0.866 *** 0.853 *** 0.879 *** 0.800 *** 0.853 *** 0.835 *** 0.858 ***
0.054 0.063 0.090 0.082 0.096 0.093 0.091 0.096
dCAL -0.078 0.155 *** 0.310 *** 0.405 ***
0.133 0.049 0.098 0.122
dEML -0.153 * 0.249 * 0.192 0.378 **
0.088 0.104 0.138 0.172
dBC -0.051 -0.095 -0.044 0.036 -0.071 -0.040 0.029 0.118























Sargan (p-val) 0.918 0.877 0.856 0.72 0.635 0.635 0.808 0.696
m2 (p-val) 0.827 0.439 0.749 0.363 0.765 0.378 0.813 0.239
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 433 301 433 301 433 301 433 301
C o u n t r i e s 8 97 6 8 97 6 8 97 68 97 6
Table 7
TFP Growth - Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM
Note. The dependent variable is the 5-year log-difference of TFP level (da). All regressors are 5-year period averages. The sample
spans between 1975 and 1999. All regressions include a constant. The estimation is performed with the two-step system-GMM
procedure. Coefficients and standard errors are reported from the first step. *, ** and *** indicate that a coefficient is significant at
10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively. The p-values for the Sargan overidentification test and the second order serial correlation (m2) test
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